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RESPONSE

IT’S NOT TRIAGE IF THE PATIENT BLEEDS OUT
JOHN P OLLOCK† & M ICHAEL S. GRECO††
In response to Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging AppointedCounsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967 (2012).
INTRODUCTION
In their article, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to
Justice, Professors Benjamin Barton and Stephanos Bibas articulate their
belief that the civil right to counsel movement (also called “civil Gideon”1)
is about “giving everyone a lawyer” in the same vein as Gideon v. Wainwright.2 They argue not only that the issues at stake in criminal litigation
are “more important” than those at stake in civil proceedings,3 but also
that pursuit of a civil right to counsel will deepen the scarcity of legal
resources available to indigent criminal defendants while replicating
“Gideon’s shortcomings in the criminal context.”4

† Coordinator, National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel.
†† Chair, American Bar Association (ABA) Working Group

on Civil Right to Counsel.
Mr. Greco was the President of the ABA in 2005–2006 and appointed the ABA Task Force on
Access to Civil Justice, which recommended the 2006 ABA policy on a civil right to counsel.
1 Many of us in the movement prefer the term “civil right to counsel” over “civil Gideon” because the latter term can mislead people into thinking we seek a right to counsel in civil cases that is
identical to the right established by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), in which the Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state courts to provide counsel to defendants in felony
cases if they cannot afford one. Indeed, Barton and Bibas appear to suffer from this confusion.
2 Benjamin Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access
to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. R EV. 967, 971 (2012).
3 Id. at 970.
4 Id. at 968.
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Barton and Bibas therefore enthusiastically applaud the Supreme
Court’s decision in Turner v. Rogers that the Constitution does not create a
categorical right to counsel for child support obligees in civil contempt cases
where the opponent is neither the state nor represented by counsel.5 Barton
and Bibas argue that Turner prevented intrusive impositions on the states
and “steered future developments toward more sustainable pro se court
reform.”6 They believe Turner dealt a “death blow” to a constitutional right
to counsel, and that such a result should be “cheer[ed].”7
As former President of the American Bar Association and current Coordinator of the National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel (NCCRC),
we reject the position taken by Barton and Bibas. In response to their
Article, we first examine whether the case-by-case approach to appointing
counsel that Barton and Bibas espouse for indigent civil litigants8 would
work any better in civil cases than it did in pre-Gideon criminal cases, and
we conclude that it would not. We then examine Barton and Bibas’s belief
that providing fewer procedural protections in civil cases is justified by
alleged “lesser” interests or “simpler” procedures in civil cases,9 or by study
data about the impact of counsel.10 We find that neither justification supports
Barton and Bibas’s position. Finally, we articulate the actual scope of the civil
right to counsel advanced by advocates (which is considerably narrower than
Barton and Bibas claim), and we set forth reasons why neither the current
economic crisis nor the problems with indigent criminal defense justify
inadequate protection of fundamentally important legal rights in civil cases.
I.

T HE STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS T HAT N ECESSITATED THE
CATEGORICAL R IGHT TO C OUNSEL IN G IDEON A LSO
E XIST IN C IVIL CASES

Barton and Bibas believe that “[a]ppointment of counsel in civil cases
must be selective and discretionary, used only for the most complex and
most meritorious cases.”11 However, this case-by-case approach failed in
criminal cases due to structural problems also present in civil cases.
In Betts v. Brady, the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel in
criminal cases should be determined on a case-by-case basis.12 But by the
5 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2011).
6 Barton & Bibas, supra note 2,
7 Id. at 970-71.
8 See id. at 971.
9 See id. at 970.
10 See id. at 991.
11 Id. at 971.
12 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).

at 971.
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time the Court revisited the question in Gideon twenty-two years later, “a
succession of cases had steadily eroded the [Betts] rule and proved it
unworkable.”13 Indeed, Betts “had repeatedly resulted in messy and frictiongenerating factual inquiries into every case.”14 As a consequence, even
before Gideon was argued, the Court had already “beg[u]n to carve out
certain exceptions to the Betts case-by-case approach.”15 Twenty-two states
joined an amicus brief in Gideon urging the Court to abandon the case-bycase approach adopted in Betts and arguing that “the rule has been, and is
being, inconsistently and confusingly applied, and the appellate decisions
are contradictory and almost invariably marked with sharp dissents.”16
Ultimately, the Court found that Betts had become “a continuing source
of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts.”17 As a result,
it held that indigent defendants charged with felonies have a categorical
right to counsel, abandoning the Betts case-by-case approach.18 The Court
later extended this categorical right in Argersinger v. Hamlin, when it held
that a criminal defendant charged with a misdemeanor may not be imprisoned unless he or she was provided with counsel.19
Why is the case-by-case approach in civil cases so problematic? Justice
Blackmun gave one reason in his dissent in Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services.20 He argued that a case-by-case approach in a termination of
parental rights case requires the court to “determine in advance what
difference legal representation might make. . . . [The trial judge must]
examine the State’s documentary and testimonial evidence well before the
hearing so as to reach an informed decision about the need for counsel in
time to allow adequate preparation of the parent’s case.”21 And because “it
will not always be possible for the trial court to predict accurately, in
advance of the proceedings, what facts will be disputed, the character of
13 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 532 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
14 Kevin W. Shaughnessy, Note, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services: A New Interest
Balancing Test for Indigent Civil Litigants, 32 CATH. U. L. R EV. 261, 282 (1982).
15 Id. at 266.
16 Brief for the State Government Amici Curiae at 3, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (No. 155), 1962 WL 75209, at *3.
17 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338.
18 See id. at 342-45.
19 407 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1972).
20 See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32-34 (1981) (holding in a 5-4 Court
decision that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed no categorical right to counsel for parents in
termination of parental rights cases).
21 Id. at 51 n.19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Although Justice Blackmun
addressed termination of parental rights cases, his arguments apply generally to all types of civil
cases, as well as to criminal cases.
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cross-examination, or the testimony of various witnesses,”22 the risk that a
judge will erroneously deny counsel is greatly elevated. The indigent
litigant will be of little help to the judge in these situations, as he or she will
not know how to make legal arguments or marshal the relevant facts in
support of the request for an attorney. Put simply, the indigent person
needs a lawyer to effectively make his or her case for why a lawyer is needed.
Another problem with Barton and Bibas’s case-by-case approach is that
it requires courts to “develop pretrial procedures and standards in order to
determine properly the need for counsel,” and “[t]here is no guarantee that
these standards will produce equitable decisions in every case.”23 Courts in
different parts of a state, faced with nebulous tests such as “fundamental
fairness” or “risk of error,” will likely develop different standards and thus
arrive at different conclusions in cases that are substantially similar.
Indeed, as the amicus brief on behalf of twenty-two states in Gideon
pointed out, “Obviously there can be no semblance of uniformity in the
conduct of such proceedings, for the very matter which will shock the
conscience of one judge will fail to penetrate the repose of another.”24 The
Gideon amici gave an example of three pairs of cases where “each set []
contained within itself substantially similar fact situations, [but] the right to
appointed counsel was denied in the first case of each pair, [and] upheld in
the second—clearly a consequence of the vague standard of ‘denial of
fundamental fairness’ which Betts has advanced.”25
Finally, when a trial court errs in deciding whether to appoint counsel,
the error may never be reviewed on appeal because the indigent litigant
may concede liability at trial due to her belief that she cannot litigate the
matter without legal assistance. Federal courts have recognized this risk in
the context of civil rights cases.26 Even if the defendant appeals, “[s]ome
[appellate] courts refuse to reach the counsel issue because unrepresented
litigants fail to request appointment of counsel or otherwise present the
issue directly and do not preserve the issue properly for appeal.”27 Additionally,
22
23
24
25
26

Shaughnessy, supra note 14, at 283.
Id.
Brief for the State Government Amici Curiae, supra note 16, at 18.
Id. at 20.
See, e.g., Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d 405, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1985) (cautioning that where
litigant is denied counsel, “there remains a great risk that a civil rights plaintiff may abandon a
claim or accept an unreasonable settlement in light of his own perceived inability to proceed with
the merits of his case, resulting in the loss of vital civil rights claims” (footnote omitted)); Caston
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[A] layman unschooled in the law
in an area as complicated as the civil rights field . . . . likely has little hope of successfully
prosecuting his case to a final resolution on the merits.”).
27 Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State-Court Right-to-Counsel Decisions, 40
C LEARINGHOUSE R EV. J. P OVERTY L. & P OL’Y 186, 187 (2006).
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because the record available on appeal will have been developed without the aid
of counsel, it will often be shaped in ways unfavorable to the pro se litigant and
will ineluctably lead appellate courts that apply a “harmless error” test to
conclude that the presence of counsel would not have made a difference.28
II.

T HE N EEDS AND C OMPLEXITY OF C IVIL CASES
D O NOT JUSTIFY LESSER PROTECTIONS

If we are correct that a case-by-case approach will lead to errors, are the
stakes really so much lower in civil cases such that these risks are justified?
Barton and Bibas claim that recognizing a civil right to counsel would
“siphon time and resources from felony cases, which are typically more
important and more complex.”29
It is an oversimplification, and incorrect, to suggest that felony cases are
per se “more important” than civil ones. Would not many parents, forced to
choose between even a lengthy time in jail or losing their children forever,
choose the former? Is the threat of jail more serious than improper confinement to a mental health facility and forced unwanted medical treatment? Is the suffering of a woman who constantly faces domestic violence
that threatens her life and deprives her of access to her home and children
any less important than the defense of the man who beats her? Did Barton
and Bibas consider such issues in concluding that felony cases are “more
important” than civil cases?
As another, more specific example, Barton and Bibas claim it is “far
more important to fund appointed lawyers in serious felony cases than it is
to provide them in, say, housing court.”30 But it is not uncommon for an
eviction or foreclosure to lead to homelessness, joblessness, and encounters
with the criminal justice system.31 And for many families, these travails can
28 See State ex rel. Adult and Family Servs. Div. v. Stoutt, 644 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Or. Ct. App.
1982) (applying a harmless error test, but conceding that “it is circular to look to the record to
determine whether counsel could have affected the result, when one of the principal missions of
counsel in any litigation is to develop the record”).
29 Barton & Bibas, supra note 2, at 970. Curiously, their argument omits misdemeanor cases,
and it is unclear whether they believe misdemeanor cases also unwisely siphon resources and are
less important or complex.
30 Id. at 972.
31 See N AT ’ L C OAL . FOR THE H OMELESS , E MPLOYMENT AND H OMELESSNESS 1-4
(2009), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/Employment.pdf (describing the
relationship between homelessness and employment); N AT’L C OAL. FOR THE H OMELESS ET
AL ., F ORECLOSURE TO H OMELESSNESS 2009: T HE F ORGOTTEN VICTIMS OF THE
S UBPRIME CRISIS 5 (2009), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/advocacy/Foreclosure
toHomelessness0609.pdf (providing a survey of direct service providers that concluded an average
of nineteen percent of their clients became homeless as result of foreclosure); N AT’L LAW C TR.
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lead to still deeper problems. Would Barton and Bibas feel differently
about housing cases in light of a 2001 study that found that homeless
children are fifty percent more likely to die before their first birthday
than housed poor children?32
Nor is it accurate to generalize felony cases as “more complex” than civil
cases. In his recent study of eviction cases, Harvard Professor James Greiner
commented that such cases often “implicate[] multiple sources of law, include[ing] state statutes, state common law, state regulations, federal statutes,
and federal regulations; they implicate[] multiple provisions or doctrines within
each source of law; and they require[] evidence from third parties such as
housing inspectors, contractors, public utilities, and/or financial institutions.”33
Other types of civil cases similarly involve complex matters on a regular
basis. Foreclosure proceedings routinely entail a confusing interplay
between federal and state law, not to mention difficult questions regarding
the movant’s standing to foreclose in the first place. And immigration cases
are often so complicated that even attorneys with years of experience in the
field struggle to keep up with a labyrinthine maze of laws and regulations.
Indigent litigants in these complex proceedings are no less bewildered, lost,
and vulnerable than criminal defendants, as they typically possess little
education and no legal experience or expertise maneuvering through the
court system. And many civil litigants, just like criminal ones, face additional barriers, from illiteracy to mental disabilities.

ON H OMELESSNESS & P OVERTY & N AT ’L C OAL . F OR THE H OMELESS , H OMES N OT
HANDCUFFS: T HE CRIMINALIZATION OF H OMELESSNESS IN U.S. C ITIES 8-11 (2009),

available at http://www.nlchp.org/content/pubs/2009HomesNotHandcuffs2.pdf (explaining the
link between evictions and homelessness, as well as the uptick in laws criminalizing aspects of
homelessness, such as begging, camping, and loitering); N.Y. STATE D EP’T OF SOCIAL SERVS.,
T HE H OMELESSNESS P REVENTION P ROGRAM: OUTCOMES AND E FFECTIVENESS 2
(1990), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1195250846.92/NYSDeptofSS%20%20Homelessness%20Prevention%20Pram%20Outcomes%20%26%20Effect.pdf (finding that legal
services intervention in 3576 eviction cases avoided 797 homelessness stints); Chester Hartman &
David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14 H OUSING P OL’Y D EBATE 461, 46869 (2003), available at http://content.knowledgeplex.org/kp2/cache/kp/10950.pdf (“[N]nearly two
out of five homeless persons who use homeless assistance programs came to be homeless via
involuntary displacement”); John Pollock, Lassiter Notwithstanding: The Right to Counsel in
Foreclosure Actions, 43 C LEARINGHOUSE R EV. J. P OVERTY L. & P OL’Y 448, 450-51 (2010)
(explaining that housing is a basic human need and describing the importance of providing counsel
to protect this arguably fundamental right).
32 See Julia C. Torquati & Wendy C. Gamble, Social Resources and Psychosocial Adaptation of
Homeless School Aged Children, 10 J. SOC. D ISTRESS & H OMELESS 305, 306 (2001).
33 D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak & Jonathan Hennessy, The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the
Future, 126 HARV. L. R EV. (forthcoming Feb. 2013) (manuscript at 30) (footnote omitted),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1948286.
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Moreover, the power imbalance in felony cases referenced by Barton and Bibas (which “pit individual defendants against experienced,
professional police and prosecutors wielding the power of the state”34) is
often mirrored in civil cases. Litigants in many types of civil cases (including foreclosure, private and public housing eviction, quarantine, immigration, and abuse/neglect) routinely face either the government or opponents
represented by counsel, both of which profit from superior experience and
access to information. Indeed, the Turner Court held that some types of
cases involving the government as plaintiff might require counsel, since
“[t]he average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or
liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel.”35
III.

E XISTING DATA D OES NOT SUPPORT PROVIDING LESSER
PROTECTIONS FOR C IVIL CASES

Barton and Bibas argue that current research suggests a right to counsel
is not really necessary in civil cases.36 They cite the alleged shortage of
randomized studies and the existence of one randomized unemployment
study (which found no significant difference in success rates of unemployment benefits hearings between defendants who were offered representation
by a Harvard Law School clinic and those who were not) to conclude that
“there seems to be little benefit to providing lawyers across the board,
especially in simple cases.”37
However, Barton and Bibas point to no body of data in support of their
argument that counsel provides “little benefit.”38 Moreover, the unemployment
34
35

Barton & Bibas, supra note 2, at 991.
Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938)).
36 See Barton & Bibas, supra note 2, at 987-89 (summarizing “more sustainable” pro se reforms).
37 Id. at 992. The authors also cite Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 496 (2007), in support of their idea that “lawyers appear to add less
value in simple misdemeanor cases than in more complex and serious cases.” Barton & Bibas, supra
note 2, at 992. However, the authors ignore the explicit, substantial caveats included in that study:
The biggest flaw is that the data concern only federal cases, and no comparable data
are available for state courts. Because the vast majority of misdemeanor defendants
are prosecuted in state courts, this gap in data is significant. Outcomes of federal
misdemeanor defendants, moreover, may not accurately represent outcomes of state
court misdemeanants. In particular, because there are relatively few pro se federal
court misdemeanor defendants, it is entirely possible that federal judges make more
accommodations to ensure that the rights of those defendants are protected.
Hashimoto, supra, at 494 (footnote omitted).
38 Barton & Bibas, supra note 2, at 992.
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study they rely on expressly warns that “[i]t would be a mistake to
overgeneralize the results of our study to conclude that offering free legal
assistance is not worth the cost or time, or even that offers of representation
make no difference in Massachusetts first-level appeals.”39 In other words,
the study itself advises against the very generalization for which Barton and
Bibas rely on it for support. Further, there are other reasons to approach
this particular study’s findings with caution.40
Barton and Bibas also praise “less intrusive” alternatives like pro se assistance,41 but point to no evidence that these alternatives are effective at closing
the justice gap. In fact, several recent studies have examined a few limited
assistance programs (like “lawyer for a day” or clinic support) and found them
wanting. For example, one study of California eviction cases discovered that a
group of civil litigants given limited assistance fared no better than a group
without assistance for all substantive results (possession, time to move out,
rent owed to landlord, money beyond rent owed to the landlord), while the
group with full representation did substantially better.42 And a study of one
Boston court’s eviction cases discovered that cases with full representation
outperformed their limited assistance counterparts by two to one.43
39 D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance:
What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2175 (2012).
40 There are several reasons why the study results must be approached with caution, including: 1) the forum studied was one that the state’s legal services programs had worked to reform for
many years, which may be why even those in the study who were not offered assistance did
significantly better than the statewide average, id. at 2173-74, 2199; 2) the study did not compare
represented and unrepresented litigants, but rather those who were offered counsel versus those
who were not, id. at 2127-28; 3) nearly half of those not offered counsel by the study received
counsel elsewhere, which may have blunted the difference in results between the groups offered or
not offered counsel, id. at 2172-73; and 4) the study was structured in such a way that it would
only pick up larger differences in results between the studied groups, id. at 2124-25, 2149. For
more discussion of the study and its limitations, see Archive for the ‘Symposium (What Difference
Representation)’ Category, CONCURRING OPINIONS, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/
category/representation-symposium (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
41 Bibas & Barton, supra note 2, at 984-85.
42 See Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled
Legal Services, 18 G EO. J. ON P OVERTY L. & P OL’Y 453, 482 (2011).
43 See Greiner et al., supra note 33 (manuscript at 28-29) (finding that thirty-four percent of
occupants with traditional attorney-client relationship lost their housing units, compared to sixtytwo percent of those without an attorney). Another eviction study carried out simultaneously by
the same study designers but of a different Boston court found that the limited assistance and full
representation groups fared similarly. See D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak &
Jonathan Hennessy, How Effective Are Limited Legal Assistance Programs? A Randomized
Experiment in a Massachusetts Housing Court 36-40 (Sept. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1880078. However, even the fully
represented group in that study did only as well as the limited assistance group of the first study,
suggesting significant differences either between the courts studied or in the nature of the full
representation provided in the two studies. Id. at 41-45.
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Our intent is neither to denigrate the creative solutions developed by
advocates and courts to assist pro se litigants, nor to suggest that a civil
right to counsel can fix all problems. In fact, a number of proponents of a
civil right to counsel have stressed that the best solution will involve both a
right to counsel as well as pro se reform.44 The point is that everyone
should be careful not to stretch the data to say more (or less) than the
findings allow. And all solutions, not just the right to counsel, ought to be
studied to determine their effectiveness; if pro se assistance is ineffective in
a given situation, it is not the right solution merely because it costs less.
IV.

N EITHER E XISTENCE OF A F INANCIAL CRISIS NOR PROBLEMS
WITH I NDIGENT CRIMINAL D EFENSE J USTIFY I NADEQUATE
PROTECTIONS IN BASIC H UMAN N EEDS C IVIL CASES

A central premise of Barton and Bibas’s article is that given the chronic
underfunding of indigent criminal defense, it would be foolhardy to create
new rights to counsel that would further tax the limits of existing resources.45 Despite their claim that civil right to counsel advocates “rarely
acknowledge[] the tension between their competing goals in the criminal
and civil contexts,”46 the National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel
(NCCRC), which has over 240 participants from 35 different states,
addressed this concern in a public informational memorandum.47 There, the
NCCRC explained that research may be the key to addressing the tension
between indigent criminal defense and civil right to counsel: “[A]dvocates
are presently investigating best ways to demonstrate how a civil right to
counsel can be cost effective by saving money in the long run. Insofar as the
civil right to counsel can be shown to save funds, pressure may be reduced
to cut funding elsewhere to finance the right.”48

44 See e.g., Russell Engler, Reflections on a Civil Right to Counsel and Drawing Lines: When Does
Access to Justice Mean Full Representation by Counsel, and When Might Less Assistance Suffice?, 9
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 97, 112-115 (2010) (outlining a three-prong approach as the best
means to achieve equal access to justice and a civil right to counsel); Steve Eppler-Epstein, The
Fight for Legal Aid Funding and Right to Counsel Advocacy: An Incremental Approach and an Overarching Message, 26 M GMT. INFO. E XCHANGE J. 41, 43 (2012) (explaining the benefits of pro se
reform but warning that it is not replacement for a lawyer).
45 See Barton & Bibas, supra note 2, at 972.
46 Id.
47 Memorandum from David Udell & Laura Abel, Nat’l Coal. for a Civil Right to Counsel,
Info. for Civil Justice Sys. About Civil Right to Counsel Initiatives (June 9, 2009), available at
http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/pdfs/NCCRC%20Informational%20Memo.pdf.
48 Id. at 9.
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To this end, rather than simply accepting the Barton and Bibas assumption
that civil right to counsel would “stretch[] limited resources further,”49 advocates are engaging in research to determine the cost savings (to states, municipalities, and to courts) of appointing counsel—savings that might significantly
reduce or entirely offset the cost of the appointments. One example of an
attempt to test this assumption is the California Legislature’s decision in 2009
to fund civil right to counsel pilot programs at roughly $9.5 million a year for
six years.50 The legislature’s bill stated that “[t]here are significant social and
governmental fiscal costs of depriving unrepresented parties of vital legal rights
affecting basic human needs;” that these costs significantly affect “indigent
parties, including the elderly and people with disabilities;” and that “[t]he fair
resolution of conflicts through the legal system offers financial and economic
benefits by reducing the need for many state services and allowing people to
help themselves.”51 The legislature found that “these costs may be avoided or
reduced by providing the assistance of counsel where parties have a reasonable
possibility of achieving a favorable outcome.”52
In addition, Barton and Bibas propose a false dilemma by suggesting
we have to choose between indigent defense and civil right to counsel. If
courts and legislatures begin to recognize a civil right to counsel, it is
possible to provide counsel to both criminal and civil litigants through
careful advance planning and coordination and the identification of new
funding streams. This is not a Pollyannaish expectation: To our knowledge,
as state legislatures and courts have added or identified a right to counsel
over the years, the expansions have not explicitly or implicitly drawn
funding away from indigent defense or any existing civil rights to counsel.53 In any case, research demonstrating the cost benefits of providing
counsel will help address this concern.
Regardless of what the research may show, however, it is a dangerous
precedent, and unacceptable in a civilized society, to suggest, as Barton and
Bibas seem to do, that fundamental rights should be protected only when
money is available. Rather, the importance of what is at stake should be
driving the conversation. Even the Lassiter Court acknowledged that in the
context of the termination of parental rights, “though the State’s pecuniary
interest is legitimate, it is hardly significant enough to overcome private

49
50

Barton & Bibas, supra note 2, at 980.
See JUDICIAL C OUNCIL OF CAL., FACT S HEET: SARGENT S HRIVER C IVIL C OUNSEL
ACT (AB 590) (F EUR) 2 (2011), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/AB-590.pdf.
51 2009 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 457 § 1(d) (A.B. 590) (West).
52 Id.
53 Unfortunately, no one has published definitive studies on this issue. Thus, we must rely
on our extensive, but anecdotal, knowledge.
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interests as important as those here.”54 The indigent defense community
historically has supported the expansion of criminal rights to counsel even
when money was tight. The NCCRC memorandum observes that despite
the serious problems with caseloads, training, and administrative support on
the indigent criminal defense side, “few champions of . . . indigent
defense services[] would willingly jettison Gideon in favor of the pre-Gideon
system of according counsel on a case-by-case basis.”55 Nor did indigent
defense advocates “argue against extending the Gideon right to misdemeanor
defendants in Argersinger on the ground that felony defendants were
receiving inadequate legal assistance.”56 Some in the indigent defense world
have argued that the strong interests at stake in both criminal and civil
cases, and the intertwining of those interests, require support for the right
to counsel in both contexts. As one prominent public defender put it, "The
lack of basic human services creates communities of crime, criminal behavior and risky lifestyles. . . . [I]mplementing a civil Gideon . . . offers
the opportunity to look at common problems and combined solutions for
the clients of both civil and defender programs."57
V.

T HE F INANCIAL IMPACT OF THE C IVIL R IGHT TO C OUNSEL
M UST B E E VALUATED IN LIGHT OF THE N ARROWER SCOPE
OF THE R IGHT B EING P ROPOSED

Barton and Bibas misrepresent the nuanced goals of the civil right to
counsel movement by suggesting that proponents “favor[] appointing
counsel in civil cases just as Gideon v. Wainwright required appointing
counsel in criminal cases.”58 To the contrary, the civil right to counsel
movement’s official documents expressly rebut the notion that the right
being sought is “just like” the Gideon right.
For example, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) 2006 policy on a
right to counsel in civil proceedings supports a right to counsel only
“where basic human needs are at stake.”59 This is not a call for appointed
counsel in all civil cases, or for all indigent persons, in the way that Gideon
and Argersinger created a right for all felony and misdemeanor defendants.
54
55
56

Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981).
Udell & Abel, supra note 47, at 11.
Id. We also have not heard calls to replace existing categorical rights to counsel in parental
rights, civil commitment, paternity, or civil contempt cases with a case-by-case approach.
57
James Neuhard, Gideon Redux: A Defender’s View, CORNERSTONE, Fall 2006, at 5, 31.
58 Bibas and Barton, supra note 2, at 968.
59 AM . BAR ASS ’ N , R EPORT TO THE H OUSE OF D ELEGATES , R ESOLUTION 112A, at 1
(2006) [hereinafter ABA R ESOLUTION 112A], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_06A112A.authcheckdam.pdf.
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In fact, the 2006 ABA policy carefully limits the right to civil proceedings
to rights that protect only five specific human needs: shelter, sustenance,
safety, health, and child custody.60
Several civil right to counsel models have also contemplated a merit test
factor, which further limits the right. In 2010, the ABA developed and
issued a Model Access Act for use by states wishing to implement a right to
counsel in civil matters.61 It includes merit tests applied by a State Access
Board to determine whether full representation by a lawyer should be
provided.62 For instance, a plaintiff must have a “reasonable possibility of
achieving a successful outcome,” while a defendant must have a “nonfrivolous defense.”63 Even where the merit tests are met, the Model Act
permits the State Access Board to provide limited scope representation
instead of full representation in certain circumstances, and to weigh the
absence of counsel on the other side in making this determination.64
In 2011, the Maryland Access to Justice Commission released a civil
right to counsel implementation plan that specifies that the level of service
provided should be “undifferentiated” and allows “[t]he [legal services]
provider . . . to exercise discretion, based solely on the client’s needs, the
merits of the action, and ethical considerations.”65 The plan states that the
provider should be able to “determine the level of legal service necessary to
assist the client effectively, which may include a determination of merit,
much as any attorney would do.”66 Further, both the ABA Model Access

60
61

Id.
AM. BAR ASS’N, R EPORT TO THE H OUSE OF D ELEGATES, R ESOLUTION 104, at 4-5
(2010) [hereafter ABA M ODEL ACCESS ACT], available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_104_revised_final
_aug_2010.authcheckdam.pdf.
62 Id. at 8. The State Access Board is “established as a statewide body, independent of the
judiciary, the attorney general, and other agencies of state government, responsible for administering the public legal services program defined by and funded pursuant to this Act.” Id. at 3.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 6. The Model Act would permit
if under standards established by the Board, and under the circumstances of the
particular matter, the Board deems a certain type and level of limited scope representation is sufficient to afford fair and equal access to justice and is sufficient to ensure that the basic human needs at stake in the proceeding are not jeopardized due to
the absence of full representation by counsel (however, limited scope representation
shall be presumed to be insufficient when the opposing party has full representation)[.]
Id.

65 M D . ACCESS TO J USTICE C OMM ’ N , I MPLEMENTING A C IVIL R IGHT TO C OUNSEL
MARYLAND 3 (2011) [hereinafter MARYLAND P LAN], available at http://www.mdcourts.gov/
mdatjc/pdfs/implementingacivilrighttocounselinmd2011.pdf.
66 Id. at 4.
IN
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Act and the Maryland Access to Justice Commission’s plan articulate that
the right to counsel on appeal should be subject to merit tests.67
It is important to note that the provision of undifferentiated services or
application of merit tests by a legal services provider or State Access Board
do not suffer from the same structural problems as the Betts-type case-bycase approach utilized by judges.68 Unlike legal service providers, judges do
not typically possess the time or resources to fully investigate a litigant’s
case, nor necessarily the in-depth expertise in the various civil subject
matters. Even if judges had both the time and the expertise, it would be
impossible for them to investigate a litigant’s case to flesh out any claims or
defenses while at the same time maintaining the judge’s impartiality, a
problem not faced by service providers.
Additionally, judges are required to utilize a nebulous due process
standard that does not lend itself well to equity when applied by different
judges across the state,69 and the particular due process test used most
frequently in the right-to-counsel context considers only three prongs: the
nature of the personal interest, the state’s interest, and the risk of erroneous
deprivation.70 A provider system can utilize more transparent and consistent
guidelines for appointment, and can consider any additional relevant factors.
A right-to-counsel system that is limited to basic human needs cases and
that includes merit tests or provider discretion to determine level of service

67 Compare ABA MODEL ACCESS ACT, supra note 61, at 5 (allowing for full representation for
appellants on appeal available where there is “reasonable probability of success on appeal under
existing law or when there is a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law,” and full representation for appellees “unless there is no
reasonable possibility the appellate court will affirm the decision of the trial court or other forum that
the opposing party is challenging in the appellate court”), with MARYLAND PLAN, supra note 65, at 4
(“An appellant should have a right [to counsel] if the appeal has merit in the eyes of the provider.”).
68 Besides the inherent, structural problems, there are many on-the-ground problems with
the current case-by-case approach. For example, a judge who determines a particular case merits
counsel may find that there is no statutory funding mechanism, requiring the judge to either
appoint an attorney without pay or draw money from her own judicial budget. Additionally, some
courts have neglected to apply even the case-by-case test and have simply ruled there is no right to
counsel in any civil case. See, e.g., Goodin v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 772 So. 2d 1051, 1055 (Miss.
2000) (“[T]his Court has held that the right[] to appointed counsel . . . [does] not apply in
civil proceedings.”); Schwarz v. Duncan, 2000 WL 33250572, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)
(unpublished) (per curiam) (“The appellant also is incorrect in her assertion that she was entitled
to court-appointed counsel, as there is no right to counsel in a civil case”).
69 As the Court in Lassiter said, “For all its consequence, due process has never been, and perhaps
can never be, precisely defined. . . . [D]ue process is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances. . . . Rather, the phrase expresses the requirement of
fundamental fairness, a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty.” Lassiter
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted).
70
Id. at 27 (citing Mathews v. Eldgridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
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is hardly analogous to the right provided in Gideon and Argersinger, which
provide a right to full representation that is universal and unqualified unless
waived.71 In fact, the misstatement that Barton and Bibas make about the
movement seeking a right just like the right provided in Gideon72 is precisely why many in the movement prefer the term “civil right to counsel” rather
than “civil Gideon.” The former term underscores that the limited civil right
being sought is not equivalent to the broad rights protected under Gideon.
C ONCLUSION
Barton and Bibas suggest that Gideon is a “1963 solution” that is inconsistent with “2012 court problems.”73 We, on the other hand, believe that
the Supreme Court correctly decided Gideon, and that it is still correct
today. And when the interests at stake in civil proceedings threaten rights
just as fundamental as those protected under Gideon, a right to counsel in
those cases is also the appropriate response.
Fortunately, even in the face of our nation’s ongoing economic struggles, the movement to establish a right to counsel in civil cases is gathering
strength.74 Turner was not a “death blow” to the progress of the civil right to
counsel movement, as Barton and Bibas believe.75 Rather, the Turner
decision should be viewed as more of a footnote because the battleground
for the expansion of these rights had already long since shifted from the
federal theater to the state courts when that case came down.
For example, eleven of the states that provided a federal constitutional
right to counsel in termination of parental rights prior to Lassiter relocated
that right to their state constitutions after Lassiter.76 In addition, recently,
71 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (“[I]n federal courts counsel must be
provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is . . . waived.”).
72 See Barton & Bibas, supra note 2, at 968.
73 Id. at 988.
74 For examples of some of the nationwide activities other than the ones listed in this article,
see John Pollock, Where We've Been, Where We're Going: A Look at the Status of the Civil Right to
Counsel, and Current Efforts, 26 MGMT. INFO. EXCHANGE J. 29 (2012), available at
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1342803913.27/MIE%20CRTC%20articles%205-16-12.pdf.
75 Barton & Bibas, supra note 2, at 970.
76 See K.P.B. v. D.C.A., 685 So. 2d 750, 752 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (construing Ex Parte
Shuttleworth, 410 So. 2d 896 (Ala. 1981), to require counsel in termination of parental rights cases
under the state constitution); In re E.H., 609 So.2d 1289, 1290 (Fla. 1992) (reaffirming In re D.B.,
385 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1980), which recognized a constitutional right to appointed counsel where
proceedings can result in permanent loss of parental custody); State ex rel. Johnson, 465 So. 2d
134, 138 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (reaffirming State ex rel. Howard, 382 So. 2d 194 (La. Ct. App.
1980), which held that due process requires the appointment of counsel where parents are faced
with charges of neglect and the possibility of removal of their child from their custody for an
indefinite or prolonged period of time); Petitions of Catholic Charitable Bureau of Archdiocese of
Boston Inc. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 490 N.E.2d 1207, 1213 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct.
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states have recognized new state constitutional rights to counsel for
parents in contested adoptions in Massachusetts77 and Illinois,78 for foster
children abuse or neglect proceedings in Georgia,79 and for parents in
Alaska custody proceedings facing an opponent represented by a pro bono
attorney,80 just to name a few. New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge
Jonathan Lippman has also announced an ambitious plan to provide
counsel for all defendants in foreclosure proceedings in New York.81 And
in California, the city of San Francisco passed an ordinance declaring its
intention to become the first “Right to Civil Counsel City.”82
Opponents of the right to counsel in civil cases such as Barton and
Bibas cavalierly recite the assumed cost of the right as if doing so constitutes an open-and-shut case. This assumption does not reflect an understanding of the actual scope of the right to counsel sought, reveals
insensitivity to protecting the basic rights of human beings, and ignores
1986) (relying upon Department of Public Welfare v. J. K. B., 393 N.E.2d 406 (Mass. 1979), which
held that indigent parents have a right to counsel in a contested proceeding to terminate parental
rights); In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127, 129-30 (Mont. 1993) (quoting approvingly from Justice
Blackmun’s dissent in Lassiter); N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. R.B., No. 13-58-04, 2005
WL 2860832, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 2, 2005) (unpublished) (reaffirming Crist v.
N.J. Division of Youth & Family Services, 320 A.2d 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974), in
explaining that principles of due process and fundamental fairness require that indigent parents
receive court appointed counsel in termination of parental rights cases); In re Evan F., 815
N.Y.S.2d 697, 699 (App. Div. 2006) (reaffirming In re Ella R.B., 285 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972),
which provided a right to counsel where the state seeks to remove child from indigent parents); In
re Johnson, No. C-810516, 1982 WL 8498 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1982) (citing State ex rel. Heller
v. Miller 399 N.E.2d 66 (Ohio 1980), and commenting that Heller relied upon the Ohio Constitution as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore “its impact . . . is not diminished, if it
might otherwise be thought to be, by . . . Lassiter”); In re D.D.F. & S.D.F., 801 P.2d 703, 706
(Okla. 1990) (reaffirming In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983 (Okla. 1978), and holding that “although the
federal [C]onstitution does not require that counsel be appointed in all termination proceedings,
we believe that the rights at issue are those which are fundamental to the family unit and are
protected by the due process clause of the Oklahoma Constitution”); In re J.M., 125 P.3d 245,
249-50 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (relying upon In re Luscier, 524 P.2d 906 (Wash. 1974), which
recognized a due process right to state appointed counsel in a parental termination proceeding);
King v. King, 174 P.3d 659, 662 n.3 (Wash. 2007) (noting that court had favorably cited to Luscier
even after Lassiter); In re Lindsey C., 473 S.E.2d 110, 122 & n.12 (W. Va. 1995) (reaffirming State
ex rel. LeMaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1974) on state constitutional grounds, and thus
rejecting argument that Lassiter “relieves this State of compliance with one or more of these
protections which have been recognized in West Virginia as constitutionally mandated”).
77 Adoption of Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d 110, 112-13 (Mass. 2012).
78 In re Adoption of L.T.M., 824 N.E.2d 221, 231-32 (Ill. 2005).
79 Kenny A. ex rel Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360-61 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
80 In re Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, 264 P.3d 835, 836 (Alaska 2011).
81 David Streitfeld, New York Courts Vow Legal Aid in Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, at B1.
82 S.F., CAL ., ADMINISTRATIVE C ODE § 58.1 (2011), available at http://www.sfbos.org
/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/committees/materials/rls111189tdr.pdf. This ordinance also established a
pilot program to work towards a goal of guaranteed right to counsel in civil proceedings. Id. § 58.2.
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the innovative and ongoing efforts to measure the true costs and benefits
of providing counsel in civil cases.
We also believe that even if providing a right to counsel will require a
substantial economic investment, in a civilized society, the protection of
rights relating to basic human needs should not depend solely on economic
terms, nor should such rights be subjected to lesser levels of due process.
While it will be a challenge to protect these basic human needs while also
providing needed legal services to indigent criminal defendants, the suggestion that society should choose one over the other is a false dilemma. The
right to counsel movement is up to the challenge, notwithstanding the
misguided analysis of some, and we look forward to continued study on how
best to effectively protect the rights of all in society.
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